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1. Introduction 
The European strategy to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) builds on the actualization 
of technological progress: countries should catch up and/or advance their 
economy-wide production system via more efficient, that is, less CO2 emitting 
technologies. As incentive system, the European Union Emission Trading System 
(EU ETS) was introduced in 2005. The system is characterized by a cap on the total 
amount of GHG that can be emmited by firms. Within the cap, emission allowances 
are traded among firms which buy or sell the pollution rights for GHG. Demand 
and supply of those allowances are equilibrated  by the price fo emission 
allowances of this ‘Coasian-type’ market. The higer the price for allowances, the 
higher the incentive to innovate on GHG-efficient technologies. Unfortunately, the 
price for allowances is quite low (today and in the past) as too many allowances 
were issued (Clò 2010). This low price threatens the innovation incentive effect of 
the EU ETS. 
The mal-functioning side in this market is the supply side. The demand for 
allowances is determined by firms’ decision-making process, that is, firms choose 
between the lowest cost strategy of either buying allowances or innovating on CO2-
efficient technologies. The supply of allowances is determined by the cap of GHG 
emissions set by the EU in a policitcal process. This cap is reduced each year by 
1.74% in order to meet the goal of reducing EU’s GHG by 20% until 2020. While 
more ambitious reduction targets may contribute to slowing down global 
warming, unilateral actions can reduce the international competitiveness of 
Europeans industrial sectors. One key issue in this respect is the carbon leakage 
effect which occurs when a country reduces its greenhouse gas emissions by substi-
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tuting own production of carbon intensive goods with imports from another coun-
try (OECD 2006). The reason for this substitution is that a country with strict GHG 
regulations imposes high costs for producing carbon intensive goods which can 
lead to a shutdown or relocation of the carbon intensive industries to countries 
with less strict regulations and thus lower production costs (Babiker and Rutherford 
2005; Copeland and Taylor 2004). The carbon leakage effect is less a problem with-
in the EU ETS but more problematic in the relation of the EU with other major 
economies where differences in regulation are distinct. 
Several solutions to the carbon leakage problem have been proposed. 
Carbon tariffs on imports of carbon intensive goods from countries with less strict 
regulations feature prominently in the discussion. The aim of this paper is to 
develop a correction mechanism for the leakage of pollutants to which the country-
specific total supply of CO2 emission allowances can be aligned to. To make it a 
generally accaptable one, this indicator must fulfill several conditions: (a) it has to 
consider the heterogeneity among member countries with respect to their specific 
production systems, (b) it has to be adjusted for carbon leakage, i.e. when firms 
reduce own CO2-emissions by relocating their production to other countries or 
simply substitute their production for imports and (c) it should also consider the 
problem of ‘nuclear leakage’, i.e. when CO2-intensive energy transformation 
systems are replaced by nuclear power be it self-produced or imported.   
On methodological grounds, we draw on works by e.g. Sueyoshi and Goto 
(2013) and Zhou et al. (2008). Using a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we identi-
fy the best-practice frontier of countries in terms of CO2-emissions. This non-
parametric approach allows us to take into account the heterogeneity of countries. 
As in Sueyoshi and Goto (2013), we distinguish the ‘managerial disposability’ and 
the ‘natural disposability’ approach, address the role of multiple projections and 
projection sets, and discuss the role of slackness conditions. As inputs and outputs 
we use the following longitudinal data for 23 European countries (years: 2000-
2009): primary energy input, final energy and non-energy consumption as ‘good 
(or desirable)’ outputs, CO2-emissions adjusted for carbon leakage and nuclear 
waste produced by countries adjusted for nuclear leakage as ‘bad (or undesirable)’ 
outputs. The adjustment weights for leakage-corrected CO2 are calculated on the 
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sector level using I/O-tables from Wiot, while the calculations for the adjustment 
weights for leakage-corrected nuclear waste are based on energy imports and ex-
ports.  
In the empirical section we compare the results with leakage adjustment 
with those without leakage adjustment, providing a first estimation of the impact 
of the CO2 and nuclear waste leakage issue on countries’ environmental perfor-
mance. Our analysis reveals that efficiency scores with leakage correction substan-
tially differ from scores without leakage correction. This suggests that the leakage 
of pollutants has a strong effect on the environmental efficiency of countries. 
Thereby carbon leakage seems to have a stronger effect on the efficiency scores 
than the leakage of nuclear waste. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
methodological approach of performance measurement and the leakage issue. Sec-
tion 3 presents methods and data. Section 4 presents the results and discusses pol-
icy conclusions.  
 
2. DEA and the leakage of bad outputs  
2.1. DEA and bad outputs 
Beginning with the first oil crisis in 1973-1974 and accelerating with the growing 
awareness of environmental problems, research in the field of energy planning has 
increased substantially  (Løken 2007). One of the key research questions in this field 
addresses the modelling and measurement of the environmental performance of 
decision making units (DMU), ie. firms and countries. Among the wide array of 
modelling techniques (Zhou et al. 2006; 2008b), the use of the data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) has increased over time.  
DEA as a non-parametric benchmarking technique allows evaluating the rela-
tive performance of DMUs. Early work applied DEA to the performance evaluation 
production processes (Charnes et al. 1978). For each DMU of a sample an efficiency 
score is calculated by comparing a vector of inputs and outputs of the DMU against 
the best-practice production frontier of the sample. The lower the efficiency score, 
the more inputs a DMU needs to reduce in order to produce the same amount of 
3 
 
outputs as the most efficient DMU of the sample (assuming the input-oriented 
form of DEA). In other words, the lower the efficiency score, the larger the distance 
between the DMU and the best-practice production frontier to which the DMU is 
compared.  
An important extension to this basic DEA setup is the distinction between 
“good” or desirable and “bad” or undesirable outputs (Färe et al. 1989). According 
to (Pittman 1983) a good output is an output of the production process that can 
be sold for a positive price at markets. Many products and services produced by 
firms are prime examples of good outputs.  In contrast, bad outputs are by-
products of a production process such as pollutants. These by-products often can-
not be sold on markets but instead impose costs on the producer in case they are 
abated or take the form of technological externalities if there is no abatement ef-
fort from the producer. DEA as a non-parametric approach is particularly well suit-
ed to deal with bad outputs. This is because one can forego specifying the weights 
a priori which are usually price information for the inputs and outputs. Prices of 
technological externalities from pollutants are notoriously hard to determine (Chen 
2013). 
 
2.2 Carbon leakage   
Previous studies applying the DEA methodology to measure the environmen-
tal performance of countries usually compile the list of inputs the countries use to 
produce outputs.  One group of studies uses inputs such as labour and capital for 
the production of goods and services with greenhouse gas emissions such as CO2 
as a bad output process (Färe et al. 2004; Zhou et al. 2010; Zofı́o and Prieto 2001). 
Other studies look at the efficiency of country’s energy production and relate in-
puts such as coal or natural gas to the production of good outputs such as energy 
and heat again with CO2 as a bad output (Sueyoshi and Goto 2013). This approach 
builds on a production accounting principle which allocates inputs and outputs to 
the country where the production takes place. This line of thinking is follows from 
the original conception and application of DEA to estimate production frontiers 
(Charnes et al. 1978; Farrell 1957). However, this production based approach has 
some limits when looking at the carbon leakage phenomenon.  
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Carbon leakage occurs when a country reduces its greenhouse gas emissions 
by substituting own production of carbon intensive goods with imports from an-
other country (OECD 2006). The economic reason behind this substitution process 
often lies in different environmental regulations among countries which impose 
high costs for producing carbon intensive products in countries with restrictive 
regulations and low costs in countries with lax regulations. Firms may take ad-
vantage of such cost differentials and reallocate production from their home coun-
try with restrictive regulations to a country with less strict regulation country while 
still selling to customers in the country with strict regulations (Antimiani et al. 
2013). In this case, emissions in the importing country with restrictive regulations 
are reduced while emissions in the exporting country with lax regulations increase. 
As Babiker and Rutherford (2005) points out, in the extreme case of perfectly sub-
stitutable and homogenous goods, carbon intensive industries completely relocate 
to lax regulation countries which can even increase the total amount of emitted 
CO2 – totally offsetting abating efforts in strict regulation countries.  
The interrelation between environmental regulation, trade and CO2 emissions 
embodied in the traded goods has sparked a controversy about who is responsible 
for CO2 emissions: the producer or the consumer (Guo et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2013). 
The answer to this question has changed over time. While traditionally, the produc-
ing site was held accountable for emissions, recent contributions emphasize a 
shared responsibility of both consumers and producers. The carbon leakage issue 
has important policy implications and is part of the recent negotiations for the new 
implementation agreement of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) (Arto et al. 2014). Recent estimates for the case of China – a 
large exporter of carbon intensive goods – reveal a difference of 38% in CO2 emis-
sions between a production based measurement approach compared to a con-
sumption based measurement approach (Liu et al. 2013). Other studies also report 
differences between production and consumption based CO2 for Spain and Italy 
(Alcántara and Padilla 2009; Marin et al. 2012) Brazil (Machado et al. 2001) and 
several Asian economies (Su and Ang 2011).  
Building on these findings, we address the carbon leakage issue in this paper 
by using CO2 as bad output based on consumption accounting approach in a DEA 
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assessment. This differs from previous studies which measure CO2 based on a pro-
duction accounting approach and demarks a contribution of this paper. This means 
that a country’s CO2 output is measured on base of CO2 embodied in the products 
and services consumed by this country. In the empirical section we show how both 
approaches to measure CO2 result in different estimations of countries’ technical 
efficiency and technical progress. 
 
2.2 Nuclear waste and its leakage   
The commercial generation of nuclear power rests on the fission of nuclear 
fuel – mostly consisting of Uranium 235 and Plutonium 239. The fission process 
releases large quantities of thermal energy which is transformed into electrical en-
ergy for commercial use. A by-product of the fission process is a variety of radionu-
clides which are in its current form no longer usable for energy generation (Crowley 
1997). This “spent fuel”1 is radioactive and decays over time. While some radionu-
clides have a short half-life period and decay in few decades, some other have very 
long half-life periods of 10,000+ years. The Nuclear Energy Agency estimates that 
of 2010 the cumulative amount of spent fuel in storage is approximately 175,000 
tonnes of heavy metal (HM) while additional 5,000 tonnes HM arise each year 
(OECD 2012).  
Previous studies investigating the environmental performance of countries 
have not incorporated nuclear waste as bad output but mainly concentrated on 
greenhouse gases as an undesirable output (Sueyoshi and Goto 2013; Zhou et al. 
2008a). This is because these studies first and foremost made methodological con-
tributions thereby paving the way to an adequate use of DEA methodology in the 
assessment of the environmental performance. Therefore they neglected using nu-
clear waste as bad output. However, there are important reasons why nuclear 
waste should be considered as a bad output. Firstly, a comparison of CO2 and nu-
clear waste reveals similarities in important characteristics that qualify CO2 as a bad 
output. Nuclear energy contributes a non-negligible share to the energy production 
1 Spent fuel is irradiated nuclear fuel which does no longer sustain a nuclear reaction in a nuclear 
power plant. We use the terms nuclear waste and spent fuel interchangeable throughout the 
paper. 
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in many industrialized economies. Nuclear waste is as inevitable a by-product of 
nuclear power generation as CO2 is in the combustion of fossil fuels. In addition, 
there are high costs associated with nuclear waste either in reprocessing nuclear 
waste or a direct disposal in geological sites. Similar to CO2, there are external ef-
fects and thus costs associated with particularly the disposal of spent fuel. Typical-
ly, these costs are underestimated and vary substantially due to a high degree of 
uncertainty and the long half-lives (Bunn et al. 2003; Taebi and Kloosterman 2008; 
von Hippel 2001). Taken together, CO2 and spent fuel share important characteris-
tics regarding the production of energy – making the case for spent fuel to be 
treated as bad output.  
Secondly, the current nature of the Kyoto Protocol focussing on CO2 abate-
ment provides an incentive for countries to switch from fossil based energy produc-
tion to nuclear power generation. By doing so, countries might emit fewer CO2 but 
this comes at the cost of an increase in nuclear waste. Not considering nuclear 
waste in any assessment of environmental performance will arguably lead to dis-
torted results in favour of countries relying on nuclear power (Cantner et al. 2007).  
Quite similar to CO2, there is also a leakage issue associated to spent fuel. 
This leakage issue arises if a country substitutes its energy production with imports 
of electrical energy from nuclear power plants from another country. Applying the 
idea of consumer responsibility in this case suggests that a country importing nu-
clear energy should be held responsible for the associated spent fuel arisings. Alt-
hough, the amount of electrical energy imported or exported is relatively small 
compared to the total amount of energy produces in European countries, it is quite 
likely that a substantial share of this energy traded stems from nuclear power 
plants. This is due to the low operational costs of nuclear energy of existing nuclear 
power plants compared to the operational costs of power plants combusting fossil 
fuels. We, thus, adjust the amount of spent fuel with the amount of exported and 
imported spent fuel due to trade of electrical energy. 
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3. Methods and data   
In the following, we present the DEA model we apply to measure the environmen-
tal performance of countries. Thereby we follow closely the approach of (Sueyoshi 
and Goto 2012a; Sueyoshi and Goto 2013). We compute annual leakage corrected 
and uncorrected efficiency scores for the years 2000-2009. Thereafter, we compare 
the deviation in the average of the leakage corrected scores over this time span and 
the average of the uncorrected scores. 2 
 
3.1 Strategic concepts for improving environmental performance 
 According to (Sueyoshi and Goto 2013), there are two basic approaches how 
DMUs can improve their environmental performance. The first of these approaches 
– termed as “managerial disposability” – emphasizes the role of technical progress 
in improving performance in complying with a set emission target for bad outputs. 
They make the example of a power plant that applies new technology to abate bad 
outputs. So even if the power plant increases its fuel input in order to increase en-
ergy production the undesirable emission of greenhouse gases decreases. In our 
setting, the environmental performance of a country improves because innovations 
in the energy sector (e.g., more efficient fuel, application of filter techniques) allow 
an increase in increase in unit output of good outputs per unit bad output.  
The second approach is referred to as “natural disposability”. Under natural 
disposability, a DMU complies to a set emission target for bad outputs by reducing 
the amount of inputs in the production process. Using again the power plant ex-
ample from (Sueyoshi and Goto 2013), the power plant’s objective is to reduce its 
inputs and bad outputs by obtaining a certain level of good outputs. In our setting, 
the environmental performance of countries improves by a simple reduction of in-
puts leading to a reduction of bad outputs.  
2 Unlike Sueyoshi and Goto Sueyoshi, T., and Goto, M. (2013). "DEA environmental assessment in a 
time horizon: Malmquist index on fuel mix, electricity and CO2 of industrial nations." Energy 
Economics, 40(0), 370-382. we are not interested in the development of environmental perfor-
mance over time but restrict ourselves to a cross-sectional comparison of countries. The reason 
for this restriction is that we are interested in the differences of efficiency scores due to leakage 
correction but not in the dynamics of efficiency scores due to technical progress. 
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The difference of both approaches lies in the treatment of the DMUs’ inputs 
in the DEA model which can substantially impact the DEA results. In order to avoid 
such methodology driven results differences confounding our analysis – aimed at 
revealing the impact of bad output leakage on the environmental performance of 
DMUs – we conduct our analysis under both strategic concepts. The robustness of 
our results is assured if differences in the environmental performance of DMUs due 
to bad output leakage persist under both the managerial and the natural disposa-
bility setting. 
 
3.2 DEA model 
Using the notation of (Sueyoshi and Goto 2013), suppose that there are 𝑛𝑛 DMUs (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛). The  𝑗𝑗-th  DMU uses a vector of 𝑚𝑚 inputs �𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 = �𝑥𝑥1𝑗𝑗, 𝑥𝑥2𝑗𝑗 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗�𝑇𝑇� to 
produce a vector of 𝑠𝑠 good outputs �𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 = (𝑔𝑔1𝑗𝑗,𝑔𝑔2𝑗𝑗 , … ,𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗)𝑇𝑇� but also a vector of ℎ 
bad outputs �𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 = (𝑏𝑏1𝑗𝑗, 𝑏𝑏2𝑗𝑗, … , 𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑗𝑗)𝑇𝑇�. It is assumed that these three vectors are 
strictly positive, which means that there is no decision making unit with a zero en-
try in one of the inputs or outputs. A vector of structural variables (𝜆𝜆 =(𝜆𝜆1,𝜆𝜆2, … , 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛)𝑇𝑇) connects the inputs with the good and bad outputs by a convex 
combination. We apply a radial DEA approach. 
Under managerial disposability, the degree of unified efficiency (UEM) for the 𝑘𝑘-th 
DMU is calculated by 
(1)  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = 1 − �𝜉𝜉∗ + 𝜀𝜀�∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥∗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔∗ + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏∗ℎ𝑓𝑓=1𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 �� with 
Maximize 𝜉𝜉 + 𝜀𝜀 � 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
+ � 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 + � 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ
𝑓𝑓=1
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟=1
� 
s.t. ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 − 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘    ( 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚) 
 ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 − 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 − 𝜉𝜉𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘    (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠) 
 ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘     (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … , ℎ) 
 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0  (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛 )  𝜉𝜉 = 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑚𝑚)  
 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 ≥ 0  (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠), & 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0 (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … ,ℎ). 
Under natural disposability, the degree of unified efficiency (UEN) is calculated for 
the 𝑘𝑘-th DMU by 
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(2)  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = 1 − �𝜉𝜉∗ + 𝜀𝜀�∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥∗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔∗ + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏∗ℎ𝑓𝑓=1𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 �� with 
Maximize 𝜉𝜉 + 𝜀𝜀 � 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
+ � 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 + � 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ
𝑓𝑓=1
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟=1
� 
s.t. ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘    ( 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚) 
 ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 − 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 − 𝜉𝜉𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘    (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠) 
 ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘    (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … ,ℎ) 
 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0 (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛), 𝜉𝜉:𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑚𝑚)  
 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 ≥ 0 (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠), & 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0 (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … ,ℎ). 
In Eq. (1) and (2)  𝜉𝜉 denotes the inefficiency score of the 𝑘𝑘 th DMU. This linear pro-
grams uses a series of slack variables for the inputs (𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥), good outputs (𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥) and 
bad outputs (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥). The scalar 𝜀𝜀 balances the impact of the inefficiency score and the 
amount of slacks for the degree of technical efficiency.3 The 𝑅𝑅s in Eq. (1) and (2) 
determine the range of inputs, good and bad outputs as specified by: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥 = (𝑚𝑚 + 𝑠𝑠 + ℎ)−1�max�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛� − min�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛��−1, 
 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 = (𝑚𝑚 + 𝑠𝑠 + ℎ)−1�max�𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛� − min�𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛��−1, and 
 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓
𝑏𝑏 = (𝑚𝑚 + 𝑠𝑠 + ℎ)−1�max�𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛𝑛� − min�𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖|𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛��−1. 
The efficiency scores (UEM and UEN) denotes the degree of efficiency of an DMU. 
An efficiency score of unity signals that the DMU is part of the efficiency frontier all 
inefficient DMUs are evaluated against. The lower the efficiency score, the less effi-
cient the DMU is compared to the best practice efficiency frontier.  
 
3.3 Data 
We aim at a complete coverage of all forms of energy from their origins through to 
final uses. As this imposes high requirements for data availability, we limit our 
analysis to 23 countries in the European Union. Data for inputs and good outputs 
stem from the energy balances provided by Eurostat (see for a description of ener-
gy balances (OECD et al. 2005). Data for bad outputs are taken from various 
sources as described below. Note that time coverage for all data is 2000-2009. We 
3 We follow standard procedures to set this scalar to a very small number (𝜀𝜀 = 0.00001). 
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however suppress the time subscript for notational ease. All data sources are sum-
marised in Table 1. 
Inputs: We regard the Gross Inland Consumption of all energy products (e.g., 
fossil fuels, nuclear heat, renewables) as input.   
Good outputs: We use the sum of the Final Energy Consumption (fuels used 
for energy production purposes) and the Final Non-Energy Consumption (fuels used 
for non-energy purposes such as the transformation to synthetic organic products) 
as good output of the countries. Data stem from the country’s energy balances 
(OECD et al. 2005). 
Bad output CO2: As Sections 2.1 and 2.2 indicate this study considers two 
bad outputs: CO2 and nuclear waste as the by-product of energy production. Re-
garding the first bad output, it is well known that beside CO2 other greenhouse 
gases such as Methan (CH4) and Nitrous Oxide (N2O) contribute to global warming. 
However, CO2 is by a wide margin the most important of these greenhouse gases. 
According to estimates from the IPCC, CO2 make up approximately three quarter of 
all greenhouse gas emissions.  
We address the carbon leakage issue by using CO2 as bad output based on 
the consumption accounting approach. This concerns the total amount of CO2 em-
bodied in all products and services consumed within a country. Recall that this con-
sumption based approach differs from the often used production accounting ap-
proach under which one would use all CO2 emitted in the production of goods and 
services as bad output of a country.  
In order to calculate the leakage corrected CO2 emissions for a set of EU-
countries, we draw on the recently developed World Input-Output Database 
(WIOD) as described in (Timmer 2012). WIOD is a joined effort to provide statistical 
data on production processes that “are characterized by international fragmenta-
tion leading to an interdependent production structure” (Dietzenbacher et al. 
2013). This interdependent production structure is due to the fact that globaliza-
tion does not only fuel the international division of labour in the production of final 
products and services but also in intermediate goods (Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg 2008). In other words, while cars might be still assembled (and exported) 
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in Germany, many of their components are not produced in Germany; they are im-
ported. World input-output tables (WIOTs) allow following the flow of products 
both for intermediate and final use across industries and countries (see 
Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, Timmer, & de Vries, 2013 for details of the WIOT con-
struction process). An additional feature of the WIOD project are supplementary 
environmental accounts encompassing information on the emission of greenhouse 
gases at the industry level for the countries. Combining the world-input-output ta-
bles with the environmental accounts allows computing CO2 emissions for coun-
tries based on a consumption approach as described below. 
Suppose 𝑛𝑛 countries (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛) can be both producers and consumers of 
goods produced in 𝑠𝑠 industrial sectors (𝑠𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑏𝑏).  From the viewpoint of produc-
tion, countries and sectors are denoted with the subscript 𝑝𝑝 and from the view-
point of consumption the subscript 𝑐𝑐 is used to denote the countries and sectors. 
The goods and services produced in sector 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 in country 𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 and used in sector 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 in 
country 𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 is given by 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 . The total sector output in a country is given by 
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  and the relatedCO2 emissions before leakage correction in 
this sector is given by 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠. Note that data on consumption of goods and ser-
vices as well as CO2 are on a yearly base (2000-2009). We however suppress the 
time subscript for ease of notation.  In a first step we compute the share in total 
sector output 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 of country (𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝) producing goods in sector (𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝)  and exports 
them to sector (𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐) of country (𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐). 
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 ∀𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝, 𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐, 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝, 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 
In a second step, we distribute the CO2 emitted in the production process in 
sector 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 in country 𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 among those 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 sectors in the 𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 countries consuming the 
goods and services. This reads as in the following: 
(4) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠. 
Note that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 represents all CO2 embodied in goods and services which are 
produced by sector 𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 in country 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 but are consumed in sector 𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 in country 𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐. 
Finally, we compute the leakage-corrected CO2 emissions of country 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 by aggregat-
12 
 
 
 
ing leakage-corrected CO2 emissions over all countries 𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 as well as all sectors 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 
and 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝: 
(5) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  
Hence, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  denotes the total amount of CO2 embodied in the goods and services 
consumed by country 𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 and corrected for carbon leakage. 
Bad output nuclear waste: Nuclear waste is the second bad output this study 
considers. As an indicator for nuclear waste of the energy production we use spent 
fuel arisings taken from the yearly Nuclear Energy reports published by OECD/NEA. 
Note that the time series data is incomplete for Sweden and Slovenia. Missing val-
ues are interpolated using data on yearly changes in spent fuel storage and long 
run averages in the production of nuclear energy. For Bulgaria, Romania and Lithu-
ania, no information on spent fuel arisings are reported at all. These data were es-
timated by an auxiliary regression explaining spent fuel arisings with the amount of 
nuclear energy produced in the OECD countries. This regression explains 71% of the 
variance in spent fuel arisings. The estimated coefficient for nuclear energy pro-
duced was then used in the linear prediction of spent fuel arisings. 
As with CO2, we address the leakage issue for nuclear waste following the 
consumption accounting approach. The leakage is due to the fact that nuclear en-
ergy is produced in one country but exported to and consumed in a different coun-
try. In order to calculate the leakage corrected spent fuel arisings we draw on data 
on electricity imports and exports of the European countries as published by Euro-
stat (NRG_125a and NRG_135a). These data represent the physical flow of energy 
between neighbouring countries. Combining these data with data on total net 
production of electrical energy (NRG_105a) allows the computation of leakage cor-
rected nuclear waste which follows very closely the above described procedure of 
the allocation of CO2 by constructing an Input-Output table. The main difference 
between the CO2 and nuclear waste leakage correction is that information on ener-
gy production, energy trade, and nuclear waste is not available at the industry sec-
tor level but only at the country level. 
Using the data on electricity imports, exports, and net electricity generation, 
we first build a matrix of the use of electricity production. Thereby 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 denotes 
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the amount of electricity produced in country 𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 but consume in country in country 
𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐. The total amount of electricity generated is given by 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . The nucle-
ar waste associated with this electricity generation before leakage correction is giv-
en by 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗. We then compute the share of consumption of electricity by country 𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 
of electricity generated by country 𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 with 
(6) 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . 
Thereafter, we distribute the nuclear waste emitted in country 𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 among those 𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 
countries consuming the electricity produced in country 𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝, which reads: 
(7) 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗. 
As a final step, we compute the leakage-corrected nuclear waste emissions of coun-
try 𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 by aggregating leakage-corrected nuclear waste emissions over all 𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 coun-
tries: 
(8) 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . 
𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  then denotes the total amount of nuclear waste embodied in the electricity 
consumed by country 𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 and corrected for nuclear waste leakage.  
 
4. Results and discussion  
4.1. Results 
We begin presenting the results by displaying the importance of leakage correction. 
Figure 1 displays the percentage difference between the level of bad outputs be-
fore and after leakage correction. Regarding CO2, most countries have higher CO2 
emissions after leakage correction. This concerns in particular Sweden (+34%) and 
Luxemburg (+42%). A few other countries such as Denmark (-22%) and Bulgaria (-
15%) have lower CO2 emissions when applying the consumption accounting ap-
proach for leakage correction.  
Regarding nuclear waste, Figure 1 only displays (for mathematical reasons) 
the percentage differences between leakage corrected and uncorrected spent fuel 
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arisings for those countries which produce nuclear energy.4 In general these differ-
ences are smaller in magnitude when compared to the CO2 leakage differences. 
However, for some countries larger deviations arise. For example, the Netherlands 
(+16%) and Czech Republic (+5%) have higher levels of nuclear waste after leak-
age correction, while Hungary (-7%) and Slovenia (-5%) have considerably less nu-
clear waste after leakage correction. Not shown in Figure 1 are countries which do 
not produce nuclear energy but can be held accountable for some nuclear waste 
due to the import of energy from countries which produce nuclear energy. The ab-
solute level of “imported” nuclear waste for these countries is rather low because 
the most important part of electrical energy is not exported but consumed in the 
country where it is produced.5  
Table 2 displays the unified efficiency scores under managerial disposability 
(Eq. 1) and natural disposability (Eq. 2) for all countries. Note that we report the 
average of the yearly efficiency scores by countries. Thereby we distinguish be-
tween the efficiency scores with and without leakage correction. Recall that a high-
er efficiency score signals higher efficiency of the country transforming fuels into 
energy (with a maximum value of 1). Comparing the efficiency scores with leakage 
correction and without leakage correction reveals two interesting findings. Firstly, 
under managerial disposability much fewer countries have the highest possible effi-
ciency score of unity with leakage correction (10 out of 23 countries) compared to 
without leakage correction (5 out of 23 countries). This suggests that many coun-
tries which would be regarded as efficient in the production of energy under the 
standard production accounting approach are not efficient under the consumption 
accounting approach. Analyzing the efficiency scores under natural disposability 
reveals the same pattern.  
Secondly, most countries have lower efficiency scores with leakage correc-
tion then without leakage correction as shown in Figure 2.6 Under managerial dis-
4 Otherwise no percentages can be calculated. 
5 Nevertheless, the leakage correction helps solving a methodological problem inherent in DEA. 
Without leakage correction, many countries would have no nuclear waste and thus a zero in one 
of the output variables. Radial DEA approaches cannot handle zero entries. Thus, without leak-
age correction, a joint assessment of the environmental efficiency of countries using nuclear 
power with countries without nuclear power would not be possible.  
6 Some part of the changes in the efficiency scores might arise from changing projection sets. 
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posability only 6 out of 23 countries have higher efficiency scores without leakage 
correction, while 23 countries have lower efficiency scores (4 countries have un-
changed efficiency scores). Denmark (-57%), Latvia (-37%) and Austria (-30%) ac-
count for the biggest drops in efficiency. In contrast Bulgaria (+19%) and Slovak 
Republic (+5%) are the only countries with substantial gains in efficiency when ap-
plying the consumption accounting approach.  
We conducted several robustness checks. A major concern in DEA analysis is 
that the results might be sensitive to the method used. For our main analysis we 
used the DEA framework as described by (Sueyoshi and Goto 2012b). A drawback 
of this approach is that not all but only one optimal solution is found. Thus, we 
rerun the DEA analysis using the recently introduced DEA/SCSC model which im-
poses strong complementary slackness conditions on the maximization problem 
(Sueyoshi and Goto 2012a). The DEA/SCSC model can be found in the Appendix. 
Under managerial disposability, the results of the DEA/SCSC model do not differ 
substantially from our original DEA model.7  
We also compare the DEA model with approaches applying different treat-
ments of pollutants as bad output. The standard DEA model introduced by (Banker 
et al. 1984) (referred to as BCC) can be adjusted by treating pollutants as inputs 
which are minimized in the linear optimization model (Førsund 2009). Applying this 
procedure and treating CO2 and nuclear waste as inputs does not substantially 
change our results. 
 
4.2. Policy implications 
The aim of the paper was to develop a correction method to address the leakage of 
pollutants which can be applied to the EU ETS framework. Based on a non-
parametric benchmarking technique we evaluated the relative performance of EU 
countries using energy consumption as good output and nuclear waste and CO2 as 
7  By conducting the DEA/SCSC model, we encountered the same problems as described by 
Krivonozhko, V. E., Førsund, F. R., and Lychev, A. V. (2012). "A note on imposing strong 
complementary slackness conditions in DEA." European Journal of Operational Research, 220(3), 
716-721. such as DMUs with below unity efficiency scores being part of the reference set for 
other inefficient DMUs. In addition, no unique solution could be identified under natural dispos-
ability.  
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bad outputs. We corrected for leakage with the application of a consumption ac-
counting approach which allocated bad outputs not to the country producing car-
bon intensive goods or nuclear energy but to the country consuming these goods 
and using this nuclear energy. As a result countries which do not produce but im-
port carbon intensive goods and services (or nuclear energy) have lower efficiency 
scores when correcting for leakage.  
This mechanism effectively addresses the leakage issue and can be applied to 
the allocation of allowances in the EU ETS. In the current phase of the EU ETS, most 
allowances are allocated by benchmarking. An installation is granted allowances for 
CO2 emissions not based on their historical emission level (grandfathering) but re-
ceive allowances of the average of the 10% best performing installations in the in-
dustrial sector (adjusted for the size of the installation). This level of allocated al-
lowances can be adjusted by a leakage correction factor. For example, under man-
agerial disposability Finland is 9% less efficient with leakage correction compared 
to without leakage correction. All Finish installations, then, receive 9% less allow-
ances reflecting leakage correction. In contrast, all Lithuanian installations would 
receive 2% more allowances in the benchmarking setting then before. 
 The above paragraph admittedly describes only a sketch of the applicability 
of our leakage correction framework. In more advanced settings not only the rela-
tive performance at one point in time for each country could be used to determine 
a correction factor but also the change of the performance over time. Countries 
that invest in technological progress shift the DEA best-practice production frontier 
leading to fewer emissions. In a dynamic DEA approach the effect of technological 
progress can be singled out by comparing best-practice production frontiers in dif-
ferent time periods. Countries at the forefront of the technological development 
can be rewarded by receiving more allowances than other countries.  
 One major advantage of our leakage correction approach is that it is doesn’t 
distort international trade. Other approaches for carbon leakage suggest carbon 
tariffs on imports and rebates for exports based on the carbon content of the trad-
ed goods and services. Although carbon tariffs are in general legal under current 
WTO law, there are many legal obstacles that limit the applicability of such taxing 
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and rebating (Veel 2009). Of course the problem remains that our approach works 
best when all major economies participate in this scheme. Another advantage of 
our approach is that it can be easily linked with the current system of allowance 
allocation within the EU ETS.  
Table 1: Average of inputs and outputs (2000-2009) 
Country 
Gross inland 
consumption 
of energy 
products in 
1000 tonnes 
of oil equiva-
lent 
Final energy 
+ non-energy 
consumption 
in 1000 
tonnes of oil 
equivalent 
CO2 before 
leakage cor-
rection in 
1000 tonnes 
CO2 before 
leakage cor-
rection 
in1000 
tonnes 
Nuclear 
waste in 
tonnes of 
heavy metal 
before leak-
age correc-
tion 
Nuclear 
waste in 
tonnes of 
heavy metal 
after leak-
age correc-
tion 
AUT 637 2193 52497 60323 0.00 2.22 
BEL 904 3663 99065 108697 118.54 113.25 
BGR 1007 1516 47094 39464 159.42 159.61 
CZE 2851 6042 105408 105654 68.83 71.84 
DEU 12404 16291 697904 737924 406.67 399.75 
DNK 758 407 79710 61663 0.00 2.42 
ESP 3172 2943 267247 279961 155.17 154.02 
EST 404 193 15287 15114 0.00 0.62 
FIN 1026 1523 61612 69102 69.71 69.74 
FRA 2273 8711 284515 309850 1028.67 1034.81 
HUN 468 1059 47007 52183 47.96 44.25 
IRL 382 1033 32210 37754 0.00 0.00 
ITA 2580 6290 381718 414717 0.00 0.36 
LTU 30 282 12387 14185 145.00 143.62 
LUX 13 133 3203 4550 0.00 0.82 
LVA 15 124 7400 7855 0.00 6.08 
NLD 1386 2801 166394 165155 11.00 12.42 
POL 8736 20248 284973 282581 0.00 4.30 
PRT 538 200 57557 58478 0.00 0.47 
ROU 1249 2248 93473 93312 131.71 133.17 
SVK 680 2251 36847 33644 57.04 55.76 
SVN 204 166 12836 13746 15.08 14.44 
SWE 434 2133 49736 67043 179.25 177.35 
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Table 2: Unified Efficiency under different models 
 Mangerial Disposability Natural Disposability 
Country 
Unified effi-
ciency with-
out leakage 
correction 
Unified effi-
ciency with 
leakage cor-
rection 
Unified effi-
ciency with-
out leakage 
correction 
Unified effi-
ciency with 
leakage 
correction 
AUT 1.00 0.70 1.00 1.00 
BEL 0.68 0.64 1.00 1.00 
BGR 0.74 0.88 0.64 0.72 
CZE 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.89 
DEU 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.76 
DNK 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.31 
ESP 0.39 0.37 0.27 0.26 
EST 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 
FIN 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.49 
FRA 0.60 0.57 1.00 1.00 
HUN 0.50 0.47 0.57 0.55 
IRL 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.95 
ITA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LTU 0.56 0.57 0.99 0.99 
LUX 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LVA 1.00 0.64 1.00 0.85 
NLD 0.39 0.39 0.60 0.60 
POL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PRT 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.78 
ROU 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.52 
SVK 0.94 0.99 1.00 1.00 
SVN 0.71 0.72 0.40 0.45 
SWE 0.77 0.63 1.00 1.00 
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Figure 1: Differences in bad outputs due to leakage correction 
  
Notes: Percentage difference between leakage corrected and uncorrected bad out-
puts 
Left: CO2, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
, mean values 2000-2009 
Right: Nuclear waste, 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
, mean values 2000-2009 
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Figure 2: Differences in efficiency scores due to leakage correction 
  
Notes: Percentage difference of efficiency scores 
Left: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
, mean values 2000-2009 
Right: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
, mean values 2000-2009 
 
Appendix 
DEA models with SCSCs 
For every primal model of a linear program – as displayed in Eqs. (1) and (2) – there 
exists a corresponding dual model. Both, the primal and the dual model can have a 
set of feasible solutions. In order to find an optimal and unique solution of both, 
the dual and the primal model, the linear program must satisfy the strong com-
plementary slackness conditions (SCSCs) (Sierksma, 1996). One way to incorporate 
SCSCs is to combine the primal and dual problem and additionally introducing a 
new decision variable 𝜂𝜂  that assures an optimal solution of the linear program 
(Sueyoshi and Goto, 2012). 
Under managerial disposability, the DEA model with SCSCs can be calculated 
by 
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(3)  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = 1 − �𝜉𝜉∗ + 𝜀𝜀�∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥∗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔∗ + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏∗ℎ𝑓𝑓=1𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 �� with 
Maximize 𝜉𝜉 + 𝜀𝜀 � 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
+ � 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 + � 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ
𝑓𝑓=1
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟=1
� 
s.t. ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 − 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘    ( 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚) 
 ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 − 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 − 𝜉𝜉𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘    (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠) 
 ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘     (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … , ℎ) 
 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0  (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛 )  𝜉𝜉:𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑚𝑚)  
 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 ≥ 0  (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠), & 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0 (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … ,ℎ) 
Minimize −� 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
 −� 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟=1
 + � 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝜎𝜎ℎ
𝑓𝑓=1
 
s.t. −∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1  − ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟=1  + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓=1 ≥ 0, (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛) 
 ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1  + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘ℎ𝑓𝑓=1 = 1 
 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚),  𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟 ≥ 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠), 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓 ≥ 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … , ℎ) 
 𝜎𝜎: URS. 
Additional constraints 
 𝜀𝜀�∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑓𝑓=1𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 � = ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1  − ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1  + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓=1  
 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1  − ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1  + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓=1 ≥ 𝜂𝜂, (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚) 
 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ≥ 𝜂𝜂 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚) 
 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 + 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟 − 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 ≥ 𝜂𝜂 (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠) 
 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓
𝑏𝑏 + 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓 − 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝜂𝜂 (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … ,ℎ) 
 𝜂𝜂 ≥ 0. 
Under natural disposability, the DEA model with SCSCs can be calculated by 
(4)  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = 1 − �𝜉𝜉∗ + 𝜀𝜀�∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥∗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔∗ + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏∗ℎ𝑓𝑓=1𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 �� with 
Maximize 𝜉𝜉 + 𝜀𝜀 � 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
+ � 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 + � 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ
𝑓𝑓=1
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟=1
� 
s.t. ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘    ( 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚) 
 ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 − 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 − 𝜉𝜉𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘    (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠) 
 ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘     (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … , ℎ) 
 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0  (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛 )  𝜉𝜉:𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑚𝑚)  
 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 ≥ 0  (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠), & 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0 (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … ,ℎ)  
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Minimize −� 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
 −� 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟=1
 + � 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝜎𝜎ℎ
𝑓𝑓=1
 
s.t. ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1  − ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟=1  + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓=1 ≥ 0, (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛) 
 ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1  + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘ℎ𝑓𝑓=1 = 1 
 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚),  𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟 ≥ 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠), 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓 ≥ 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … , ℎ) 
 𝜎𝜎: URS. 
Additional constraints 
 𝜀𝜀�∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑓𝑓=1𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 � = ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1  − ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1  + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓=1  
 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1  − ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1  + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓=1 ≥ 𝜂𝜂, (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚) 
 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ≥ 𝜂𝜂 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚) 
 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 + 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟 − 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 ≥ 𝜂𝜂 (𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠) 
 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓
𝑏𝑏 + 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓 − 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝜂𝜂 (𝑓𝑓 = 1, … ,ℎ) 
 𝜂𝜂 ≥ 0  
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